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ABSTRACT
THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTION REGULATION AND NEURAL COGNITIVE CONTROL
ON DISTRESS TOLERANCE
Alicia L. Milam
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Michelle Kelley

Tolerance of negative emotions has been associated with transdiagnostic negative mental
health outcomes. Theory and research implicate emotion regulation and cognitive control as
factors in tolerance of negative emotions. But their unique contributions to tolerance of negative
emotions and interdependency have been unclear due to methodological limitations. This study
aimed to explicate cognitive and emotional factors affecting distress tolerance in a non-clinical
sample of emerging adults. Undergraduate psychology students completed self-report measures
of emotion regulation ability and tolerance of negative emotions. The N2 ERP component
elicited by a Go-NoGo task was also used as a neurophysiological marker of cognitive control
with larger mean difference amplitudes indicating greater cognitive control. Age correlated
significantly with tolerance of negative emotions and cognitive control and was included as a
covariate. Individuals with high emotion regulation ability were found to have greater tolerance
of negative emotions. Larger mean N2 difference amplitudes predicted greater tolerance of
negative emotions before age was added to the model, but was no longer significant when age
was included as a covariate. No significant interactive effects were found between emotion
regulatory ability and cognitive control predicting tolerance of negative emotions. These findings
suggest that emotion regulation training may be the most appropriate target to increase tolerance

of negative emotions. Future studies should increase power and assess emotional salience and
temporal dynamics of self-regulation to further clarify the mechanism of these relationships.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Low distress tolerance, especially low tolerance of negative emotions, has been identified
as a core feature in a wide range of psychological disorders (Zvolensky et al., 2010). Distress
tolerance is a relatively stable trait-like construct (Cummings et al. 2013), but its malleability has
been suggested by the effectiveness of targeted interventions (Hayes, 2004; Linehan, 1987; Segal
et al., 2002). These treatments may benefit from better understanding factors that predict distress
tolerance. Distress tolerance is conceptualized as a form of goal-directed self-regulation (Leyro
et al., 2010). Goal-oriented models of self-regulation have found that cognitive control and
emotion regulation are principal components of self-regulation (Koole & Aldao, 2016; Wagner
& Heatherton, 2016), thus they may play a role in distress tolerance.
Limited research supports this (Arici-Ozcan et al., 2019; Bardeen et al., 2015; Benfer et
al., 2017; Macatee, Albanese, Clancy, et al., 2018), but little research has examined cognitive
control and emotion regulation together in order to understand their unique and interactive
associations with distress tolerance. Gaining a better understanding of the effects of emotion
regulation and cognitive control on distress tolerance may be crucial to interrupting cycles of
maladaptive coping by advancing treatments using self-regulation as a mechanism of change.
The proposed study endeavors to examine whether emotion regulation and cognitive control will
act as unique predictors of tolerance of negative emotions. Given their theorized relationship,
this design will allow each variable to control for the other. This study will also aim to close a
gap in the literature concerning specific mechanisms of cognitive-affective self-regulation by
evaluating the moderating role of cognitive control in the relationship between emotional
regulation ability and tolerance of negative emotions.
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Distress Tolerance
Distress occurs when an individual experiences a response to a specific stimuli that
creates an internal conflict, negative feelings, discomfort, or pain (Ridner, 2004). An
evolutionary perspective of distress would suggest that these unpleasant feelings operate to
motivate an individual to respond to a situation or stimulus that has the potential to threaten
survival (Bracha, 2004; Carretié et al., 2009; Tracy, 2014). For example, seeing a snake may
cause a distressing fear response to act as a cue to avoid the threat. Distress cues can be
unreliable due to the complexity of selecting the most adaptive responses for the context.
Distress cues may become problematic when they activate too forcefully for the situation,
respond to non-threatening stimuli, or drive maladaptive coping strategies (Ghaemi Kerahrodi &
Michal, 2020; Swerdlow et al., 2020). Having an appropriate level of tolerance for distress can
allow an individual to regulate their behavior in a more adaptive manner (Ke & Barlas, 2020;
Myruski et al., 2017). For instance, the ability to endure an unpleasant interaction with a boss or
colleague may permit an appropriate interpretation and response that will allow the individual to
keep their job.
Distress tolerance is the ability to withstand discomfort in the pursuit of a goal (Leyro et
al., 2010). Distress tolerance allows an individual to resist emotional impulses that may be
detrimental to their goals and relationships, such as yelling at their boss when they want to keep
their job to remain financially stable. According to the hierarchical model of distress tolerance,
distress tolerance is comprised of five subdomains: tolerance of uncertainty, tolerance of
ambiguity, tolerance of frustration, tolerance of negative emotions, and tolerance of physical
discomfort (Bardeen et al., 2013; Zvolensky et al., 2010). Previous literature has found that low
distress tolerance, particularly low tolerance of negative emotions, is a transdiagnostic risk factor
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across a range of psychopathology. Tolerance of negative emotions refers to a secondary reaction
to emotional distress distinct from related emotion constructs such as state and trait negative
affectivity (Cougle et al., 2011; Keough et al., 2010). Kremyar et al. (2019) evaluated this
distinction using factor analysis and found that tolerance of negative emotions loaded onto a
factor separate from negative emotionality and demoralization.
Distress tolerance, and its subdomain, tolerance of negative emotions, are important in
emerging models of psychopathology, such as the hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology
(HiTOP; Kotov et al., 2017). HiTOP utilizes factor analysis and comorbidity meta-data to create
a dimensional classification system for psychopathological symptoms. Within the HiTOP
framework, tolerance of negative emotions has been primarily associated with internalizing
distress disorders including generalized anxiety disorder (Keough et al., 2010), depression
(Benfer et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2013), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Erwin et
al., 2018; Vujanovic et al., 2011), eating pathology (Anestis et al., 2012; Kelly et al., 2014; Yiu
et al., 2018), and fear dimensions (Bernstein et al., 2011) such as obsessive-compulsive disorder
(Laposa et al., 2015; Robinson & Freeston, 2014), specific phobias (Michel et al., 2016), and
panic disorder (Kutz et al., 2010). Disinhibited externalizing behaviors such as substance abuse
(Allan et al., 2015; Zvolensky et al., 2009), suicidality (Anestis, Knorr, et al., 2013; Anestis,
Pennings, et al., 2013; Franklin et al., 2011), and self-harm (Peterson et al., 2014; Slabbert et al.,
2018), as well as nonpathological disinhibited behaviors (Anestis et al., 2012) including risky
sexual behaviors (Tull & Gratz, 2013) and dangerous driving habits (Beck et al., 2013), have
also been associated with low tolerance of negative emotions. Evidence suggests that these
disinhibited externalized behaviors constitute a maladaptive means of coping with internal
distress (Macatee et al., 2016; Anestis et al., 2013; Magidson et al., 2013; Özdel & Ekinci, 2014)
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demonstrating the pervasive impact tolerance of negative emotions can have on overall
functionality and quality of life.
In addition to acting as a risk factor for the development and maintenance of symptoms,
tolerance of negative emotions is implicated as a factor in suboptimal treatment outcomes
(Cummings et al., 2013; Reese et al., 2019). Low tolerance of negative emotions contributes to
interference with treatment engagement (Bornovalova et al., 2012), high treatment dropout rates
(Daughters et al., 2005), and decreased symptom reduction following treatment (Banducci et al.,
2017). Low tolerance of negative emotions may interfere with behavioral interventions that
require the individual to endure distress in pursuit of long-term treatment goals. For example,
exposure therapy requires patients to approach and remain in the presence of stimuli or situations
that evoke negative emotion (Clark, 2013). Substance use treatments involve tolerance of
negative emotions resulting from withdrawal, so it is not surprising that low distress tolerance
predicts readiness for change (Ali et al., 2017; Basharpoor et al., 2020) and relapse (Shorey et al.,
2017). Cognitive therapies may also be impacted by low tolerance of negative emotions, which
has been associated with rigid cognitive schemas and interpretation bias (Kertz et al., 2015;
Oglesby et al., 2018), as well as a reluctance to experience the cognitive dissonance involved in
therapy to elicit treatment effects (Basharpoor et al., 2021; McHugh et al., 2014). Tolerance of
negative emotions also plays a role in the treatment outcomes of acceptance and skill-based
therapies, such as Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1987). Research suggests that
patients who complete treatments without addressing distress tolerance are more likely to relapse
(Hsu et al., 2013), highlighting the importance of distress tolerance as an important resilience
factor (Arici-Ozcan et al., 2019; Hosseinian & Nooripour, 2019). Overall, there is evidence
demonstrating the important role of tolerance of negative emotions in mental health treatment
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outcomes. Thus, a better understanding of tolerance of negative emotions may be important in
improving treatment outcomes (Macatee et al., 2015).
Tolerance of negative emotions has been measured primarily by self-report. Self-report
measures of tolerance of negative emotions include the Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons
& Gaher, 2005) and Distress Intolerance Scale (DIS; McHugh & Otto, 2012). The DTI
incorporates anxiety sensitivity, tolerance of frustration, and tolerance of emotions; thus,
research with the DTI may focus on anxiety and related psychological disorders while the DTS
has more broad application and associations with a wider range of psychological disorders
connected to tolerance of negative emotions (Bebane et al., 2015; Cougle et al., 2013; Mitchell et
al., 2013). In addition to self-reports, only one behavioral measure has been designed to assess
tolerance of negative emotions. The Emotional Image Tolerance (EIT) task measures the latency
of persistence in viewing unpleasant images after negative emotional distress has been
established (Veilleux et al., 2019). However, relationships between the EIT and psychopathology
are limited to modest correlations; thus, as a self-reported measure of tolerance of negative
emotions, the DTS is likely to have greater clinical utility (Glassman et al., 2016). Tolerance of
negative emotions has also been found to be highly correlated with perceived stress, state and
trait negative affect, and impulsivity while behavioral distress tolerance is a performance
measure more closely related to achievement and not significantly correlated with
psychopathology or self-reported distress tolerance (Kiselica et al., 2015). The EIT may be a
better representation than the DTS of behavioral persistence through negative affect, but the DTS
likely better represents willingness to persist through negative affect (Veilleux et al., 2019) or
broader beliefs about one’s ability to persist. As reviewed above, such beliefs have been linked
to important outcomes by considerable research using the DTS. Given that individuals with low
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tolerance of negative emotions believe that they are unable to persist through experiencing
negative affect, they may seek more immediate relief by engaging in detrimental avoidance or
maladaptive coping behaviors (Anestis et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2009; Lass et al., 2020). Other
forms of self-regulation, such as emotion regulation, may play a key role in determining the level
of confidence an individual has in their ability to tolerate negative emotion.
Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation refers to any strategy used to alter or control an individual’s
emotional experience including behavioral, physiological, and subjective aspects of emotional
responses (Campos et al., 1989; Gross & Muñoz, 1995). This may be done consciously or
unconsciously (Gyurak et al., 2011; Koole et al., 2015; Koole & Rothermund, 2011) and may be
either adaptive or maladaptive depending on the strategy chosen in a particular context and the
goals of the individual (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; English et al., 2017; Tamir, 2016;
Tamir & Gutentag, 2017). Emotion regulation has emerged as an underlying transdiagnostic
mechanism implicated in the development and maintenance of a broad range of psychopathology
related to affect (Aldao et al., 2010; Beauchaine & Zisner, 2017; Bradley, 1990) and has been
recognized as a feature of psychopathology in every major category of psychiatric disorder in the
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2001) has been instrumental in
creating unifying terminology and defining the time course of regulatory strategies. Gross
presents an exhaustive outline of the course of emotional reactivity and regulation using a
cognitive-behavioral framework. According to the process model, an emotional response occurs
in a given situation in which an emotion-eliciting stimulus is present. The individual attends to
the stimulus or a particular aspect of the stimulus, appraises or interprets the stimulus, which
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then leads to a particular response. Gross (2015) postulates that regulation of an emotional
reaction can happen at any point in this process with differential properties at each point (Gross,
2015).
The point at which an emotional reaction is regulated is used to characterize each
emotion regulation strategy. Prior to the situation occurring, an individual can engage in
situational selection by determining what stimuli to expose themselves to through approach or
avoidant behaviors. Situational modification occurs during the presentation of a stimulus and
involves a change in the situation itself such as an individual distancing themselves from a
stimulus. An individual may also choose to distance themselves mentally from a stimulus using
attentional deployment strategies such as distraction. If an individual does not choose to
disengage from the stimulus, they may decide instead to reframe their interpretation of a
particular stimulus through cognitive change strategies such as cognitive reappraisal. An
individual may also attempt to regulate through response modulation which may be viewed as a
coping strategy such as expressive suppression or self-harm during or after the occurrence of an
emotional reaction (Barrett et al., 2001; Gross, 2014, 2015).
The utilization of a particular regulation strategy will influence the way an individual
interacts with the emotional stimulus in the future (Farmer & Kashdan, 2014; Gross, 2002;
Williams et al., 2018). Much research has focused on the consequences of using different
adaptive or maladaptive regulation strategies in clinical and healthy populations (Aldao et al.,
2014; Birk & Bonanno, 2016; Thompson et al., 2010; Vanderhasselt et al., 2014). While a given
strategy may be more commonly associated with positive or negative outcomes, it is important to
note that regulation strategies are highly context-dependent, and their adaptiveness should be
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determined by the outcome rather than the chosen process (Birk & Bonanno, 2016; Haines et al.,
2016; Koole & Veenstra, 2015).
The ability to deliberately choose and apply a regulatory strategy depends first on the
ability to recognize and understand different emotional states, particularly negative emotional
states (Kashdan et al., 2015). Kalokerinos et al. (2019) found that low negative emotional
differentiation affects the appropriate and effective use of emotion regulation for downregulating negative emotion, but not adaptive strategy selection. It has also been shown that
intrapersonal emotional differentiation is related to interpersonal emotion differentiation which
likely impacts the ability to set appropriate affective goals and subsequently use flexible
regulation required in social settings (Israelashvili et al., 2019). Regulatory flexibility is the
ability to assess internal and external states and choose the regulatory strategy most appropriate
to achieve adaptive goals in context as well as shift strategies fluidly. Past findings suggest that
this flexibility is a key skill for adaptive emotional regulation and broader reactive resilience
(Aldao et al., 2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Haines et al., 2016; Kobylińska & Kusev, 2019;
Waugh et al., 2011).
Belief in the controllability of emotions is related to more successful use of regulation
(Ford & Gross, 2019; Gutentag et al., 2017) and increased emotion regulation flexibility
(Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Kobylińska & Kusev, 2019). The belief that emotions are
uncontrollable also leads to higher levels of distress and decreased successful use of adaptive
strategies regardless of strategy selection (Kneeland et al., 2016). A possible explanation for this
relationship could be that diminished overall self-efficacy for emotion regulation leads to a
decrease in regulatory success and an increase in negative affect, as observed with reappraisal
specific processes (De Castella et al., 2018; Lee & Hayes-Skelton, 2018; Zlomuzica et al., 2015).
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Self-report measures of emotion regulation use three main approaches to assess
individual differences: evaluating the frequency of specific strategy usage, stress coping strategy
usage, and regulatory competency (Gross, 2014, p. 331). Measures that assess stress coping do
not focus on a specific emotion or immediate stimuli; rather, they tend to assess general coping
mechanisms for nonspecific stressors without regard for the efficacy, duration, or target of
regulation. This approach may be more akin to exploring behavioral patterns impacting mood
over time than the other two approaches, which focus on specific emotional responses to
immediate stimuli. Although the assessment of specific strategy use is aligned with the process
model, research paradigms using this approach must account for the context and goals of the
regulatory strategy use. Without the measurement of regulatory flexibility and outcomes
following strategy use, conclusions that can be drawn from the assessment of strategy use alone
are limited. By asking an individual how effectively they are able to regulate their emotions, the
use of measures assessing regulatory competency account for self-efficacy, outcomes following
regulation, and are not limited by the context of the regulation (Gross, 2014, p. 333).
Emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions are both forms of self-regulation
used to cope with negative affect, thus prompting questions about the directionality of their
relationship (Van Eck et al., 2017). Belief in a weakened ability to withstand negative affect
leads to a sense that the emotional state must be changed, motivating an individual to attempt to
regulate their emotions. The degree of effectiveness will then likely be diminished due to the
impulsive nature of the regulation attempt with the goal of short-term relief from affect, and
subsequent poor strategy selection (McMahon & Naragon-Gainey, 2018; Naragon-Gainey et al.,
2017). In a study examining the effective use of emotion regulation strategies in individuals with
low and high distress tolerance, Jeffries et al. (2016) found that individuals with low tolerance of
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negative emotions engaged in more maladaptive and ineffective emotion regulation strategy use
such as avoidance, suppression, and distraction rather than more adaptive strategies such as
reappraisal and acceptance.
Similarly, emotion regulation predicts an individual’s ability to tolerate negative emotion
(Arici-Ozcan et al., 2019; Bardeen et al., 2015; Macatee, Albanese, Clancy, et al., 2018), as
ineffective emotion regulation is likely to increase distress levels or make it difficult for
downregulation of negative affect to occur. This pattern may signal to an individual that they are
unable to cope with distress (Dryman & Heimberg, 2018), decreasing tolerance of negative
emotions. Damaged coping self-efficacy would then be reinforced by future experiences in a
cyclical manner such that deficits in both emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions
may impact psychological well-being and emotional functionality (Ford et al., 2017; Ford &
Gross, 2018). Van Eck and colleagues (2017) used factor analyses and latent profile analyses to
determine the impact of emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions on various
negative mental health outcomes finding both unique and interdependent relationships between
emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions.
Because tolerance of negative emotion determines how overwhelming negative affect is,
it is possible for two individuals to report identical subjective distress levels while the individual
with higher tolerance of negative emotions is functionally less affected. Those with low tolerance
of negative emotions are more likely to devote a greater amount of cognitive resources to
attending to negative affect, impairing their ability to make goal-oriented decisions including
how to best regulate emotions (Preston et al., 2020). Attentional deployment could also be used
to divert attention away from distress or to a given goal, thereby increasing tolerance levels. For
instance, Benfer et al. (2017) found that attention to negative emotions moderated the
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relationship between low negative emotional distress tolerance and internalizing symptoms in
individuals that attended to negative emotions without direction but not in those expressly
directed to attend to negative emotions. This suggests that emotion regulation ability may relate
to tolerance of negative emotions differently based on whether conscious effort is being
employed toward thought control in tolerance of negative emotions (Braunstein et al., 2017;
Mauss et al., 2007). Thus, cognitive control may also be an important factor in tolerance of
negative emotions. The present study hypothesizes that fewer emotion regulation difficulties will
predict higher levels of reported tolerance of negative emotion when controlling for cognitive
control (Hypothesis 1).
Cognitive Control
Cognitive control, or executive function, involves monitoring and controlling thought
processes that influence goals and behaviors, broadly encompassing the cognitive processes of
shifting, updating, and inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2017). Shifting, or task-switching, refers
to moving between mental sets. Goals must be understood and often prioritized to optimally shift
focus from one goal to another, implicating shifting in cognitive and psychological flexibility
(Herd et al., 2014). Updating is the ability to sustain and amend information while minimizing
the influence of distractions and is commonly associated with working memory (Coifman et al.,
2019). Inhibition is often referred to as the ability to halt an automatic response, usually due to a
conflict in goals (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The ability to identify a goal, monitor potential
conflicts, identify a response as inconsistent with a goal, and halt an automatic, or prepotent,
response have all been previously associated with inhibitory control (Miyake & Friedman, 2012;
Xie et al., 2017).
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Recent literature has found that inhibitory control is the core domain of cognitive control.
Utilizing latent variable modeling, Friedman & Miyake (2017) found that their initial threefactor solution describing inhibition, shifting, and updating as the fundamental processes of
cognitive control was better characterized as a bifactor model due to a tendency for all
behavioral measures of cognitive control to load onto the inhibition factor. Thus, inhibition is
now considered the core domain of cognitive control, enabling maintenance of goal focus by
preventing distraction.
Attention and conflict monitoring are essential components of inhibitory control. Conflict
monitoring theory proposes that increased attentional control is engaged to detect competition
between conflicting potential responses or goals (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). When the
response required by a stimulus differs from the anticipated or prepotent response, inhibitory
control is recruited to resolve the conflict. Inhibitory control then utilizes both conflict
monitoring and attentional control to prevent an unwanted response that does not align with a
particular goal. For example, in the Go-NoGo task, participants must respond to more frequent
“Go” stimuli and inhibit responses from “NoGo” stimuli. Conflict between the prepotent
tendency to respond to “Go” stimuli and the goal of not responding to “NoGo” stimuli is
resolved by the detection of this conflict, triggering recruitment of cognitive control to resolve it
through inhibition (Kropotov et al., 2011; Randall & Smith, 2011). The inhibition process may
be influenced by salient distractors such as distressing emotions which can make it more difficult
to maintain a goal-oriented approach or make the desired goal less clear (Leshem & Yefet,
2019).
Many researchers view cognitive control as influential to emotion processing, with
emotional responses determined, in part, by the ability to inhibit or regulate an automatic
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emotional response. Inzlicht et al. (2015) further postulate that emotion is the foundation of
cognitive control due to the emotion-based input required for recognizing the value of a
particular goal. Neuroimaging studies suggest that both emotionally salient and emotionally nonsalient aspects of cognitive control may influence regulatory processes related to emotion both
uniquely and interactively (Doré et al., 2017; Ochsner et al., 2012). For instance, Brown et al.
(2015) found that individuals with high impulsivity had lower levels of activation in areas
associated with emotion regulation on both emotional and non-emotional Go-NoGo tasks. They
also found that participants exhibiting more impulsive behavior reported higher subjective
distress ratings on emotional Go-NoGo tasks which was associated with lower activation of
prefrontal regions indicative of regulatory control. Additionally, self-reported cognitive control
has been associated with both emotion regulation ability (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2017; Hayes et
al., 2010) and tolerance of negative emotions (Arici-Ozcan et al., 2019; Bardeen & Fergus, 2016;
Juarascio et al., 2020; Mitchell et al., 2017).
Tolerance of negative emotions requires an individual to do a cost-benefits analysis to
determine whether a given goal is valued above the experience of unpleasant affect (Leyro et al.,
2010). To increase tolerance of negative emotions, an individual must be able to look beyond
current distress and self-preservation to a later desired goal and inhibit the prepotent response of
seeking relief through emotion regulation (Macatee, et al., 2015; Marshall et al., 2011). Clear
goal-directed behavior in response to emotional stimuli requires the ability to assess a situation,
identify and prioritize a goal, then inhibit an automatic response that is not aligned with that goal
(Marks et al., 2019; Sommers & Coffen, 2017). Thus, cognitive control employed for tolerance
of negative emotions likely engages conflict monitoring and attentional control for inhibitory
control and may interact with emotion regulation.
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Effective emotion regulation necessitates the acknowledgment of a conflict between the
current affect and the goal affect, therefore also using cognitive resources (Schmeichel, 2007).
Cognitive resources are limited and must be allocated in a prioritized manner for efficient
processing (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Gan et al., 2017; Ortner et al., 2016). Self-regulation
requires the use of cognitive resources, restricting the regulatory processes that can occur
concurrently (Blair, 2016). For instance, it has been noted that the behavioral measurement of
distress tolerance is currently restricted due to excessive cognitive task demands (McHugh &
Otto, 2011, 2012; Veilleux et al., 2019). Those with increased access to cognitive resources are
better able to complete concurrent tasks requiring cognitive control. In a study using selfreported attentional and emotion regulation capabilities, O’Bryan et al. (2017) found that those
with greater attentional control had greater emotional clarity and were better able to engage in
goal-directed behaviors under distress.
Cognitive demands are also a concern within the measurement of inhibitory control,
forcing researchers to consider and control for confounding experimental task demands. Thus,
unless the goal of the study is to explore the impact of increased cognitive demands or limited
cognitive resources (Leue et al., 2012; MacNamara & Proudfit, 2014; Xing et al., 2016), simple
behavioral tasks are often preferred for assessing performance (Gutiérrez-Cobo et al., 2017;
Megías et al., 2017). Neurophysiological measures during a simple behavioral task are useful for
objectively evaluating cognitive individual differences using the magnitude of electrical neural
activation during cognitive control or assessing the time course of a cognitive process
(Woodman, 2010). One such neurophysiological measure is the N2, an event-related potential
(ERP) component related to inhibitory control through conflict-monitoring and attentional
control aspects of cognitive control (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004). The proposed study will
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examine the association of cognitive control, indicated by the N2 difference wave amplitude,
with self-reported tolerance of negative emotions. It is anticipated It is hypothesized that
cognitive control will predict higher tolerance of negative emotions when controlling for emotion
regulation (Hypothesis 2).
The N2 ERP Component
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are used as time-locked neural markers of particular
cognitive processes, elicited by an experimental or behavioral stimulus (Luck, 2014a). An ERP
component can be either stimulus-locked or response-locked meaning that the neural signal
being assessed is either associated with the presentation of a stimulus or with the subsequent
response. ERPs are isolated by measuring the electrical activity from the brain at various points
on the scalp across repeated instances of a particular stimulus or response (Luck, 2014a, p. 1215).
Polarity, latency, and scalp distribution are semi-flexible characteristics of ERP
components used to identify and describe them (Luck, 2014b, p. 66). Given common variability
in these factors between individuals and paradigms, a component is ultimately defined by the
functional process it represents and the neural area of generation. Scalp recordings can make it
difficult to definitively identify the propagation point where the neural process originates due to
the distribution of electrical activity. Thus, ERPs are identified by fluctuations in functional
activity during controlled behavioral tasks and can be manipulated experimentally (Luck, 2014b,
p. 67).
Classic behavioral tasks such as the Go-NoGo task are used to assess neural indicators of
cognitive control such as the N2 by creating a conflict between the stimuli presented and
prepotent response which must be attended to in order to inhibit the initial response. The N2 is a
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stimulus-locked ERP component, evoked approximately 200 ms after stimulus presentation in
the fronto-central region of the scalp (Luck, 2014b; Luck & Kappenman, 2012). The Go-NoGo
task requires cognitive control to monitor response conflict and inhibit prepotent responses
(Botvinick et al., 1999; Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004). Participants respond to a set of “Go”
stimuli and are instructed not to respond to “NoGo” stimuli. As the Go stimuli are more
common, the participant’s automatic tendency will be to respond. For the NoGo stimulus, the
participant must adequately attend to the stimuli presented, recognize that there is a conflict
between the expected or prepotent response and the one required by the presented stimulus, then
inhibit the prepotent response. Due to the enhancement of these cognitive control requirements
during NoGo trials compared to Go trials, a larger amplitude N2 is seen for NoGo than for Go
stimuli (Kropotov et al., 2011; Randall & Smith, 2011). Thus, a mean difference wave, in which
the N2 wave for NoGo trials are subtracted from the N2 wave for Go trails, can be used to assess
the activation of inhibitory control (Luck, 2012).
The N2 is thought to be comprised of three distinct subcomponents, the N2a, N2b, and
N2c also called the mismatch negativity, anterior N2, and posterior N2 respectively (Luck, 2012,
p. 334). The mismatch negativity is evoked primarily by auditory stimuli when an individual
becomes aware of a stimulus incongruent with other stimuli. The anterior N2 represents
inhibitory control through conflict monitoring and attentional control. The posterior N2 is
lateralized and split into the N2 posterior bilateral (N2pb) component, which varies based on
physical features and the probability of the target stimulus being presented, and the N2 posterior
contralateral (N2pc) component which is seen during search tasks and is not sensitive to physical
features or probability (Luck, 2012, p. 333).
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The N2 is said to be part of an N2/P3 complex because the larger P3, evoked by
unexpected stimuli and decision-making processes, reliably follows the N2 (Luck, 2014c, p.96).
The final component the commonly co-occurs with the N2 is the anterior P2, usually occurring
just prior to the anterior N2 in the 150-250 ms range. The P2 responds in a similar manner as the
N2pb, leading some to suggest that the N2pb and anterior P2 represent opposing polarities of the
same generator (Luck, 2012, p. 333). While the different components have been distinguished
from one another with distinct localizations, time frames, and associated cognitive processes, the
density of data requires the anterior N2 to be parsed out from the other components before it can
be interpreted. Principal component analysis (PCA) is commonly employed to decompose the
different components in a given waveform by extracting factors within the N2 time range and
separating distinct components from one another (Dien, 2012).
Limited research has examined associations between the anterior N2 and tolerance of
negative emotions. Macatee et al. (2018) used a complex Go-NoGo task to detect fluctuations in
the anterior N2 in a clinical sample, with larger (i.e. more negative) NoGo N2 amplitudes
associated with higher tolerance of negative emotions. In a separate study, Macatee, Albanese,
Crane, et al. (2018) found that distress tolerance was related to the N2 in cannabis users during a
stress induction task. Further research is needed to determine whether these associations
generalize to a non-clinical sample and represent a basic mechanism of tolerance of negative
emotions. Additionally, there is a gap in the literature regarding the unique and interactive effects
of emotion regulation and cognitive control on tolerance of negative emotions which may be
important in understanding the self-regulatory mechanisms involved in the malleability of
tolerance of negative emotions. In this study, it is expected that emotional regulatory ability will
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interact with cognitive control such that greater cognitive control will strengthen the relationship
between emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions (Hypothesis 3).
The Present Study
The proposed study aims to elucidate the relationship between neural markers of
cognitive control, emotional regulation, and tolerance of negative emotions. The Go-NoGo task
will be used to elicit the anterior N2 in order to assess cognitive control. Self-report measures of
emotional regulation and tolerance of negative emotions will also be used to account for the role
of self-efficacy and self-perception of responses to negative affect in mental health outcomes. It
is hypothesized that self-reported emotion regulation will predict self-reported tolerance of
negative emotions (Hypothesis 1), cognitive control, indicated by the N2 difference wave
amplitude, will be associated with self-reported tolerance of negative emotions (Hypothesis 2),
and cognitive control will moderate the relationship between self-reported emotional regulation
ability and self-reported tolerance of negative emotions (Hypothesis 3).
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Participants included 71 undergraduate students recruited from the Old Dominion
University psychology research pool. All participants received research credit for their
participation. Of the 71 participants, nine were excluded due to excessively poor effort, indicated
by getting fewer than 50% of measured trials correct. An additional three participants were
excluded due to excessive noise in the data following artifact rejection and interpolation
procedures (described in ERP Data Processing). Lastly, two participants were excluded due to
missing survey data. The final sample of 57 participants (mean age = 20.24, SD = 0.49) met the
suggested sample size for analyses.
The suggested sample size was determined by a change in R2 power analyses with .80
power and the alpha level set at .05 using G*Power 3.1 (Erdfelder et al., 2009). Given that the
only other study found to test moderation of a model with similar constructs found a small to
medium effect size but used different measures (Bardeen et al., 2015), power analyses were run
using a Cohen’s f2 of .15. Results yielded a proposed sample size of 55 participants. Participants
were primarily White female freshmen with 71.9% (n = 41) of the sample identifying as female,
70.2% (n = 40) of the sample identifying as White, and consisting of 50.9% (n = 29) freshman.
Demographics are further described in Table 1.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Analytic Sample
Analytic Sample
(n = 57)
n
%
Gender
Male
Female
Trans
Class Standing
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Post-baccalaureate
Race/Ethnicitya
White
Black
Asian
Native American or Pacific Islander
Hispanic
Multiracial

14
41
2

24.6%
71.9%
3.5%

29
14
7
6
1

50.9%
24.6%
12.3%
10.5%
1.8%

40
14
2
3
11
12

70.2%
24.6%
3.5%
5.3%
19.3%
21.1%

Note. a = Total percentages may not sum to 100% due to multiple response allowances.
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Procedure
This study was approved by the Old Dominion University Institutional Review Board.
Informed consent, including a description of study procedures and goals, was provided to each
participant before they began the study. Online questionnaires were completed using Qualtrics
on a lab computer in a private room. After the participant completed the questionnaires, an
electroencephalography (EEG) cap and electrodes were placed on the participant’s head to
measure neural activity during behavioral tasks. Electrooculography (EOC) electrodes were also
placed lateral to the outer canthus and below the left eye to measure blinks and saccades for
correction of eye movement artifacts in the EEG data.
Go-NoGo task instructions were described on the computer screen. Instructions were
clarified as necessary by experimenters prior to the completion of ten practice trials. Practice
trials were observed by an experimenter, who provided corrective feedback, answered questions,
and clarified instructions as needed. In each trial, participants were presented with a Gabor patch
oriented in one of four angles (0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees; see Figure 1). Participants were
instructed to respond to Gabor patches presented in 3 orientations with a left mouse click (e.g.,
Go trials) and not to respond to the Gabor patches presented in one orientation (e.g., NoGo
trials). The NoGo orientation was presented either vertically or horizontally and counterbalanced across participants. Participants completed approximately 240 trials administered with
Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). Each orientation of Gabor patch was presented for
approximately 60 (25%) of the trials, with an approximate collective 180 (75%) Go stimuli and
approximately 60 (25%) total NoGo stimuli. Variation in the number of trials due to stimulus
randomization was expected. After the Go-NoGo task was completed, the electrodes were
removed and the participant was debriefed.
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Measures (see Appendix A)
Tolerance of Negative Emotions
The Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons & Gaher, 2005) is a 15-item selfadministered questionnaire that assesses the ability to withstand negative affect and emotional
distress. The DTS consists of four subscales evaluating aversiveness (‘I can’t handle feeling
distressed or upset’), appraisal (‘I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed or upset’),
attentional absorption (‘When I feel distressed or upset, all I can think about is how bad I feel’),
and the desire for immediate regulation of negative emotions (‘When I feel distressed or upset, I
must do something about it immediately’). Individuals completing the 15-item questionnaire
indicate how true an item is for them when they are upset. Responses are rated using a five-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 2 = mildly agree, 3 = agree and disagree equally, 4 = mildly
disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree). Item six in the Appraisal subscale is reverse-scored. A total
DTS score ranges from 15 to 75 with higher scores indicating greater tolerance of distressing
negative emotions.
Simons and Gaher (2005) found that the DTS demonstrated good convergent validity,
correlating modestly with the frequency of a particular mood (i.e. mood typicality) (r = .17) and
positive affectivity (r = .26). Moderate correlations were found with measures of mood
acceptance (r = .47), affect lability (r = -.52), negative mood regulation (r = .54), and negative
affectivity (r = -.59; ps < .001). The pattern of associations also offers preliminary evidence
indicating that the DTS demonstrates good discriminant validity. These findings suggest that
tolerance of negative emotions as measured by the DTS is related to but distinct from reactive
mood, the tendency to experience negative affect, and negative emotion regulation. Internal
consistency was demonstrated in the original university student sample (subscale Cronbach’s α =

23
.72 - .82). Test-retest reliability over a six-month period (r = .61) suggests that DTS scores are
susceptible to change over time and may reflect intraindividual variability. Internal consistency
in the current sample was excellent, demonstrating a Cronbach’s alpha of .91.
Emotion Regulation Difficulties
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale-Short Form (DERS-SF; Kaufman et al.,
2015) assesses the ability to regulate negative emotional states. Adapted from the original 36item DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), this 18-item questionnaire asks participants to rate the
frequency of orientation and responses to negative emotions on a five-point scale in which 1 =
almost never (0-10%), 2 = sometimes (11-35%), 3 = about half of the time (36-65%), 4 = most of
the time (66-90%), and 5 = almost always (91-100%). The DERS-SF was validated using three
samples of adolescents recruited for suicide and self-injury studies as well as two separate
samples of undergraduate students. The DERS-SF retained all six subscales from the original
DERS with three items per subscale and 81-96% shared variance with the original DERS. The
subscales include nonacceptance of emotional responses (‘When I’m upset, I feel guilty for
feeling that way.’), difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior (‘When I’m upset, I have
difficulty getting work done.’), impulse control difficulties (‘When I’m upset, I have difficulty
controlling my behavior’), emotional awareness (‘I pay attention to how I feel.’), lack of access
to emotion regulation strategies (‘When I’m upset, I believe there is nothing I can do to make
myself feel better.’), and lack of emotional clarity (‘I have difficulty making sense out of my
feelings.’).
Kaufman et al. (2015) demonstrated that the DERS-SF had good concurrent validity with
measures of depression (r = .66), the Revised Symptom Checklist (SCL-90-R; Derogatis &
Cleary, 1977) Global Severity Index (r = .64), state (r = .66) and trait (r = .75) anxiety,
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acceptance of negative emotions (r = -.79), and self-concept (r = .64; ps < .01) comparable in
strength and directionality with the original DERS. The three items in the awareness subscale are
all reversed scored. Individual item scores are summed to create a total score that ranges from 18
to 90 with higher scores indicating greater difficulty with regulating negative emotions.
Excellent internal consistency was also demonstrated in university students in the original
validation study (total Cronbach’s α = .97; subscale Cronbach’s αs ranged from .90 to .96) and in
the present sample (Cronbach’s α = .92).
N2 ERP Component
The N2 ERP component evoked during the Go-NoGo task was used to assess cognitive
control. Specifically, the anterior N2 for the NoGo stimuli is reliably larger (more negative) than
the anterior N2 for the Go stimuli, with the magnitude of the difference associated with
inhibiting responses on NoGo trials. The difference between these two waves can show
elicitation of conflict monitoring and inhibition while partially accounting for individual
differences in baseline reactivity to stimuli (Rietdijk et al., 2014). The anterior N2 is also
maximal at the fronto-central electrodes (i.e. Fz, FCz, and Cz). Thus, difference waves will be
calculated for each participant by subtracting the mean NoGo N2 amplitudes from the mean Go
N2 amplitudes at the maximal fronto-central site.
The N2 has demonstrated good convergent validity with performance measures of the
Go-NoGo task including response time and NoGo commission error rate (Falkenstein et al.,
1999; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Randall & Smith, 2011). The N2 is evoked by this task at
approximately 200 ms following stimulus presentation with a typical window of approximately
175 ms to 350 ms (Luck, 2014c; Rietdijk et al., 2014). Signal-to-noise ratio and internal
consistency are excellent (α = .90) for experiments using at least 30 NoGo trials (Leue et al.,
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2013; Rietdijk et al., 2014). The present study includes approximately 60 (25%) NoGo trials per
participant with slight variations in the final number of NoGo trials used for analyses due to
stimulus randomization and artifact rejection procedures. Only counter-balanced (vertical or
horizontal) Go stimuli were assessed to prevent physical stimulus bias.
Demographics
Information regarding participant age, gender, race, ethnicity, and class standing were
gathered to describe the sample and provide information about the generalizability of results. The
sample was predominantly white and female (see Table 1 for demographic information). This
pattern is typical of undergraduate psychology samples recruited using the Old Dominion
University psychology research pool.
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Figure 1
Example of Go-NoGo Task Trials
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ERP Data Processing
EEG data were collected using a custom 33-channel ActiveTwo BioSemi system
sampling at 1024 Hz. One data file was converted from 2048 Hz to 1024 Hz to allow consistent
processing and averaging. Initial processing was done in the ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck,
2014) in order to parse artifact, or variance in the data that is not due to brain activity, from the
relevant data. A high-pass filter (.1 Hz) was applied to separate low-frequency scalp skin
conductance from neural activity. An independent component analysis (ICA) was used to
identify and correct eye-blink artifacts in the EEG data. ICA solutions were assessed for high
amplitude frontal activity in the 20 to 50 microvolt range and smooth activity power spectrums.
Components identified as blinks were then rejected and removed from the EEG, with a visual
inspection of the pre and post ICA data to ensure that only eye movement was removed.
Bins were defined by assigning the appropriate trial type based on the order of events
represented by trigger codes in the EEG data. The bins of interest included the counter-balanced
Go correct (i.e. counter-balanced Go stimulus followed by a button press) and NoGo correct (i.e.
NoGo stimulus followed by no response) bins. Data were then separated into epochs of -200 ms
to 800 ms with the presentation of the stimulus at zero.
Artifact rejection was used to determine which trials could be used for analyses and
which would be rejected due to noise. Trials with eye-blinks within 200 ms of stimulus
presentation were removed as the stimulus presentation time would be inaccurate if the
participant’s eyes were closed. Trials were also rejected due to high amplitude noise caused by
excessive tension, movement, or disconnected electrodes. Interpolation was reviewed on a caseby-case basis as an option for those with artifact rejection due to poor electrode connection at
noncritical measurement sites. Data for participants with fewer than 30 accepted Go or NoGo
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trials following interpolation were excluded due to excessive noise in the trials (Leue et al.,
2013; Rietdijk et al., 2014). Participants with fewer than 30 accepted trials included the nine
participants excluded for poor effort.
A 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied in preparation for the PCA to limit the isolation of
noise or artifact related factors and to assist with visualization of waveforms. Anterior N2
components were averaged across NoGo trials and Go trials for each participant. The grand
average waveform (see Figure 2.) was then computed by averaging the waveforms across the
participants. Evidence of overlapping or high-density ERP components common in the N2/P3
complex were found, demonstrating that a principal component analysis (PCA) would be
necessary to isolate and accurately assess the amplitude of an anterior N2 component. N2 mean
difference amplitudes were derived from the difference between NoGo and Go trial waveforms.
Mean amplitudes were used rather than peak amplitudes to prevent high-frequency signals from
biasing amplitude measurements (Luck, 2014).
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Figure 2

Microvolts (µV)

Grand Average ERP Waveform at FCz by Stimulus Type

Time (ms)
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Principal Component Analysis
Due to the presence of multiple ERP components during the anterior N2’s time window
beginning approximately 175 ms and ending approximately 350 ms after stimulus presentation.
(Luck, 2014c; Rietdijk et al., 2014), a two-step principal component analysis (PCA) using ERP
PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010) was used to separate anterior N2 candidates from other ERP
components. Temporal PCA with Promax rotation was first used to reduce dimensionality and
identify factors uniquely contributing to the variance in the data. Horn’s parallel analysis was
used to determine how many components to extract. The resulting scree plot (see Figure 3.)
indicated 17 factors for extraction, accounting for 98.3% of the variance in the data. A spatial
PCA on each of the 17 temporal factors was then conducted using Infomax rotation to extract
components by measurement location. Horn’s parallel analysis was used to determine the
number of factors to retain. The resulting scree plot (see Figure 4.) indicated the retention of
three factors per temporal factor, accounting for 87.9% of the variance in the data.
All factor scores and factor loadings were rescaled to microvolts for visualization and
comparison purposes (Dien, 2012). Out of the 51 total components identified by the
temporospatial PCA (see Figure 5.), four potential anterior N2 candidates were chosen for
further evaluation based on maximal location, peak latency, and modulation by the Go-NoGo
task. Component TF07SF1 had a peak latency of 170.90 ms and a maximal negative peak at
channel FCz. Component TF10SF1 had a peak latency of 123.05 ms and an overall negative
maximal peak at PO3. Component TF08SF2 had a peak latency of 319.34 ms maximal at Fz.
Lastly, component TF04SF2 had a peak latency of 270.51 ms and a negative maximal peak at
Fz.
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Each of these candidates was then assessed visually for modulation by the Go-NoGo task
and the polarity of maximal frontocentral peaks. Following visualization of the data, TF10SF1
was found to be slightly more maximal at occipital sites and was earlier than an expected anterior
N2, indicating that it may represent a separate N2 component. Despite clear modulation,
appropriate latency, and a negative peak maximal at Fz, the overall maximal peak for TF08SF2
was positive and occipital (O1). TF04SF2 did not demonstrate modulation with the Go-NoGo
task and was found to be negative at focal sites, but was overall positively and occipitally
maximal (O2) upon visual inspection. Strong modulation by the Go-NoGo task, clear peak
negativity at a maximal frontocentral site (FCz), and a peak latency near the expected time
window made TF07SF1 the only candidate consistent with the anterior N2 literature. Mean
amplitude measurements were then taken from factor TF07SF1 (see Figure 6.) from 160 ms to
180 ms, centered around the factor peak. The Go mean amplitudes were then subtracted from the
NoGo mean amplitudes to create a NoGo minus Go difference mean amplitude to be used for
analyses.
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Figure 3

Eigenvalue

Temporal PCA with Promax Rotation Horn’s Parallel Analysis Scree Plot

Number of Components

Figure 4

Eigenvalue

Spatial PCA with Infomax Rotation Horn’s Parallel Analysis Scree Plot

Number of Components
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Figure 5

Microvolts (µV)

Temporospatial PCA Factor Waveforms by Stimulus Type

Time (ms)

Figure 6

Microvolts (µV)

Temporospatial PCA Factor TF07SF1 Anterior N2 Waveform by Stimulus Type

Time (ms)
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Analysis Plan
Univariate outliers for each variable were checked using boxplots to identify extreme
outliers beyond three standard deviations from the median to be assessed individually and
Winsorized as necessary. Multivariate outliers were assessed for leverage using Mahalanobis
distances, discrepancy using studentized deleted residuals, and influence using Cook’s D and
DFBETAS. Predictors required acceptable collinearity with a tolerance above 0.2 and variance
inflation factor below 10 for inclusion in the model. Linearity was assessed using scatter plots
with a LOWESS line for each predictor. Transformation was considered for unmet linearity
assumptions. Homoscedasticity of residuals was assessed by predicting the standardized squared
studentized deleted residuals from the predictors. A heteroscedastic-consistent estimator of
standard error was used to correct for the violated homoscedasticity assumption. A Durbin
Watson test between 1.5 and 2.5 was used to determine whether the residual independence
assumption was met. Lastly, a Q-Q plot of standardized residuals and each predictor was visually
assessed for normal distribution of residuals.
A multiple regression analysis was then run in SPSS v.27 (IBM Corp., 2020) using the
PROCESS macro v. 3.5 (Hayes, 2017) to enable bias corrected bootstrapping estimates of
confidence intervals around the coefficients when performing a moderation analysis. The
analysis aimed to determine whether emotional regulation predicts tolerance of negative
emotions (Hypothesis 1), establish the relationship between cognitive control and tolerance of
negative emotions (Hypothesis 2), and show whether emotion regulation and cognitive control
interact such that at different levels of cognitive control, emotion regulation ability would have a
greater or lesser impact on tolerance of negative emotions (Hypothesis 3). Zero-order
correlations were included to evaluate the model for suppression effects and potential covariates.
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A significant interaction would prompt probing by testing the simple slopes at the mean, one
standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean. The JohnsonNeyman Technique would also be implemented to determine the values of cognitive control for
which emotion regulation ability is significant.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Assumptions were tested for a multiple regression assessing whether emotion regulation
ability (ER), the mean difference anterior N2 amplitude (N2), or their interaction (ER*N2)
predicted tolerance of negative emotions. Variable distributions and outliers were visually
examined using histograms and boxplots. No extreme univariate outliers were identified.
Emotion regulation was slightly positively skewed but was well within the bounds of normal
skew and kurtosis (skew = 0.71, kurtosis = 0.14) (Kim, 2013). N2 was mildly leptokurtic (skew
= 1.04, kurtosis = 4.12). Both variables were reassessed as normally distributed (ER skew = 0.79,
ER kurtosis = 0.15; N2 skew = -0.32, N2 kurtosis = -0.82) following multivariate outlier
corrections.
Leverage was assessed using Mahalanobis distances with 3 cases found to exceed the chisquared critical value of 11.34. No studentized deleted residual cases were found to exceed the tcritical value of 4.04 assessing discrepancy. Influence was evaluated using Cook’s D and
standardized DFBETAs, with one case exceeding the f-critical value of 0.85 and no cases
exceeding the cut-off of +/-1 for small to medium samples respectively. Analyses were run with
and without outliers and it was determined that multivariate outliers impacted the interpretation
of results. Cases with multivariate outliers were Winsorized to the value at 95% or 5% of the
sample distribution for the given variable as necessary (Hayes, 2017).
Linearity was assessed using scatterplots of each predictor with unstandardized residuals
and LOWESS lines. Despite a mildly negative quadratic curve in emotion regulation, the
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Winsorized predictors were found to be approximately linear. Significant results predicting the
standardized squared studentized residuals from the predictors indicated that the residuals did not
have constant variance and differed from the mean (p = .035). The HC3 heteroscedasticconsistent estimator of standard error was used to correct for the violated homoscedasticity
assumption (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Normality of residuals was met with no excessive
deviations from the normal fit line on a visually assessed Q-Q plot of unstandardized residuals
and expected normal values. Residual independence (Durbin Watson = 1.98) and acceptable
multicollinearity (N2 VIF = 1.10; ER VIF = 1.11; N2*ER VIF = 1.20) were also affirmed.
Age, gender, and ethnicity were evaluated for inclusion in the model as covariates based
on correlations with the outcome variable. Point-biserial correlations showed a significant
correlation (p = .028) of -.29 for gender and a nonsignificant correlation (p = .737) of -.07 for
ethnicity with tolerance of negative emotions. Pearson correlations also found a significant
correlation between age (r = .34, p = .009) and tolerance of negative emotions. Based on
significant correlations with the outcome variable, the model was run both with and without age
and gender to assess the impact on model interpretation. The model interpretation did not change
when gender was added to the model but did differ when age was added to the model.
Participants ranged from 18 to 28 years old with one extreme outlier at 42 years old. Analyses
were conducted with and without age as a covariate for comparison purposes.
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Table 2
Pearson Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Study Variables
Variable

1

2

3

4

1. Tolerance of Negative Emotions

--

2. Emotion Regulation Difficulties

-.64***

--

3. N2 Difference Amplitude

.27*

-.01

--

4. Age

.34**

-.23

.31*

--

Mean

50.47

40.08

-0.70

20.46

SD

12.53

13.99

0.31

3.70

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Tolerance of Negative Emotions = Distress Tolerance
Scale total score. Emotion Regulation Difficulties = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale
total score. N2 Difference Amplitude = The difference between the mean amplitude on NoGo
and Go trials.
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Primary Analyses
Zero-order bivariate correlations were evaluated for all variables included in the model
(see Table 2.). All correlations were in the theorized direction with tolerance of negative
emotions correlating negatively with difficulties with emotion regulation (r = -.64, p < .001) and
positively with the N2 difference amplitude (r = .27, p = .046), representative of greater
cognitive control. Difficulties with emotion regulation were not significantly correlated with the
N2 difference amplitude (r = -.01, p = .918) or age (r = -.23, p = .079). Age was correlated
positively and significantly with both tolerance of negative emotions (r = .34, p = .009) and the
N2 difference amplitude (r = .31, p = .018).
Variables were centered around the mean to reduce multicollinearity and analyses were
run both with and without age (M = 20.46, SD = 3.70) as a covariate. The omnibus model
consisting of difficulties with emotion regulation (M = 40.08, SD = 13.99), the N2 difference
amplitude (M = -0.70, SD = 0.31), and the interaction term significantly predicted tolerance of
negative emotions, accounting for 52.4% of the variance in tolerance of negative emotions (M =
50.47, SD = 12.53), F(3, 53) = 14.70, p < .001, R² = .524. Emotion regulation was uniquely
associated with tolerance of negative emotions when controlling for cognitive control, B = -0.63,
95% CI [-0.87, -0.39], p < .001. Cognitive control was also uniquely associated with tolerance of
negative emotions, controlling for emotion regulation, B = 0.98, 95% CI [0.03, 1.93], p = .043.
The addition of the interaction term to the model accounted for an additional 5.5% of the
variance (∆R² = .055) in tolerance of negative emotions ∆F(1, 53) = 3.25, p = .077. Cognitive
control was not found to significantly moderate the relationship between emotion regulation and
tolerance of negative emotions, B = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.21], p = .077.
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Age was added to the model as a covariate and the omnibus model again significantly
predicted tolerance of negative emotions, accounting for 52.6% of the variance in tolerance of
negative emotions, F(4, 52) = 11.95, p < .001, R² = .546. Age was not a significant predictor of
tolerance of negative emotions when controlling for emotion regulation and cognitive control, B
= 0.54, 95% CI [-0.12, 1.21], p = .104. Emotion regulation was uniquely associated with
tolerance of negative emotions, controlling for cognitive control and age, B = -0.63, 95% CI [0.36, -0.84], p < .001. Cognitive control was no longer uniquely associated with tolerance of
negative emotions when controlling for emotion regulation and age, B = 0.69, 95% CI [-0.25,
1.63], p = .145. The addition of the interaction term to the model accounted for an additional
6.1% of the variance (∆R² = .061) in tolerance of negative emotions, ∆F(1, 52) = 3.77, p = .058.
Cognitive control did not significantly moderate the relationship between emotion regulation and
tolerance of negative emotions, B = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.21], p = .058.
A post-hoc power analysis was conducted for each interaction using G*Power 3.1
(Erdfelder et al., 2009) with a sample size of 57, alpha set to .05, and a Cohen’s f2 calculated
from the ∆R² for each interaction effect. The first model included three predictors and the
addition of the interaction term increased R² by .055. The small effect size was determined by
dividing the increase in R² by one minus the increase in R² to get a Cohen’s f2 of .058. The power
analysis revealed a power of .43 for detecting an effect of this size. This calculation was repeated
for the model with age added as a covariate to include four predictors in the model. The addition
of the interaction term increased R² by .061 with a calculated Cohen’s f2 of .065. A power of .47
was found for detecting an effect of this size.
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Table 3
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Distress Tolerance without Age
Predictor

B(SE)

t

Constant

50.57(1.25)

40.38***

Emotion Regulation Difficulties

-0.63(0.12)

-5.34***

N2 Difference Amplitude

0.98(0.47)

2.08*

Interaction

0.10(0.05)

1.80

* p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 4
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Distress Tolerance with Age
Predictor

B(SE)

t

Constant

39.42(7.03)

5.61***

Emotion Regulation Difficulties

-0.60(0.12)

-5.05***

N2 Difference Amplitude

0.69(0.47)

1.48

Interaction

0.10(0.05)

1.94

Age

0.54(0.33)

1.66

* p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to examine the association between emotion regulation,
cognitive control, and tolerance of negative emotions. Emotion regulation (Hypothesis 1) and
cognitive control (Hypothesis 2) were expected to uniquely predict tolerance of negative
emotions. It was also hypothesized that emotion regulation and cognitive control would have
interactive effects when predicting tolerance of negative emotions (Hypothesis 3). Bivariate
correlations with tolerance of negative emotions were used to assess potential covariates. Gender
was significantly correlated with tolerance of negative emotions such that females were had
better tolerance of negative emotions than males. Due to the small number of males (n = 14) in
the sample, caution should be taken when generalizing this interpretation. Gender was not
included as a covariate because inclusion in the model did not change model interpretation. Age
was found to be significantly positively correlated with both tolerance of negative emotions and
cognitive control indicating that as age increased, both distress tolerance and cognitive control
increased.
Hypothesis 1 was supported, as fewer reported emotion regulation difficulties were found
to predict higher tolerance of negative emotions in the sample when controlling for cognitive
control. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, higher cognitive control, represented by a larger or more
negative N2 difference amplitude, was significantly predictive of higher tolerance of negative
emotions scores when controlling for emotion regulation. However, the effect was no longer
significant when age was added to the model as a covariate. Though age was not a significant
predictor of tolerance of negative emotions, the change in results suggests that age accounted for
a portion of the variance previously attributed to cognitive control in predicting tolerance of
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negative emotions. Hypothesis 3 examined the interactive effects of emotion regulation and
cognitive control predicting tolerance of negative emotions. Results did not find evidence that
cognitive control moderated the relationship between emotion regulation and tolerance of
negative emotions. However, the study may have been underpowered to make conclusive
statements about interactive effects.
Implications
The study replicates findings of the strong association between emotion regulation and
tolerance of negative emotions (Conway et al., 2021; Jeffries et al., 2016; Van Eck et al., 2017).
Given the theorized relationship between emotion regulation and cognitive control (Ochsner &
Gross, 2008) including literature suggesting that emotion regulation relies on cognitive control
(Inzlicht et al., 2015), previous studies have neglected to control for cognitive control when
assessing the relationship between emotion regulation and tolerance of negative emotions. This
study was able to determine that emotion regulation and cognitive control account for unique
variance in tolerance of negative emotions. Findings suggest that the process by which emotion
regulation impacts tolerance of negative emotions is at least partially distinct from the process by
which cognitive control impacts tolerance of negative emotions. This implies that emotion
regulation requires more than attending to, recognizing conflict in, and inhibiting a given
emotional response to influence willingness to tolerate negative emotions.
Though the exact mechanism of the relationship between emotion regulation and
tolerance of negative emotions is unknown, decreased frequency of emotion regulation due to
lack of regulatory self-efficacy may decrease the threshold for tolerance to distress due to the
belief that regulation will be unsuccessful (De Castella et al., 2018; Ford & Gross, 2019). Those
with better emotion regulation abilities may also be able to tolerate distress because they engage
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in multiple emotional regulatory strategies (Ford et al., 2019) and employ both short-term and
long-term regulatory goals to control the intensity of their emotional responses (Shafir et al.,
2015). This may allow them to cope with negative emotions more efficiently and increase their
willingness to experience negative emotions (Millgram et al., 2019). In contrast, when emotion
regulation and distress tolerance goals do not match, that may also lead to regulatory strategy use
that diminishes tolerance of negative emotions (Sheppes, 2020). For instance, individuals with
strong cognitive reappraisal skills are likely able to re-frame the meaning of negative emotions or
distress to indicate progress towards a goal, which may increase acceptance (Troy et al., 2018)
and motivation and make them more willing to tolerate emotional distress (English et al., 2017).
However, when cognitive reappraisal is used to regulate an emotion unrelated to a task-oriented
goal, the regulatory goal itself demonstrates a lack of willingness to tolerate negative emotions in
pursuit of a goal (Millgram et al., 2015; Tamir et al., 2020; Vishkin et al., 2020). In addition to
self-efficacy and matching goals, it is also likely that the cognitive processes used in emotion
regulation and the impact of tolerance of negative emotions differs depending on the type of
emotion regulation used (Naragon-Gainey et al., 2017).
It has been postulated that inhibition and emotional regulation may rely on similar neural
processes with differences in application based on emotional salience (Moodie et al., 2020). For
instance, Buodo et al. (2017) found that neural inhibitory control differed based on the emotional
salience of the stimuli. Results of the present study finding a unique association between
cognitive control and tolerance of negative emotions suggest that attentional control, inhibition,
and conflict monitoring play a role in tolerating negative emotion beyond strategic emotional
regulatory selection (Bigman et al., 2017). Because tolerance of negative emotions is an
inherently emotional process, significant findings using a Go-NoGo task without emotionally
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salient stimuli imply the use of distinctly cognitive processes in tolerance of negative emotions.
Willingness to tolerate negative emotions in pursuit of a goal may then incorporate attentional
control as a means of sustaining motivation, conflict monitoring to assess costs and benefits, and
inhibitory control to prevent avoidance or a similar short-term relief-seeking behavior from
distress (Andrés et al., 2021; Chung et al., 2021; Leyro et al., 2010). It is possible, however, that
these cognitive processes in tolerance of negative emotions relate differently to emotionally
salient and non-emotionally salient stimuli, thus there may be a need to explore direct
comparisons between stimulus types more thoroughly in future studies.
The significance of these results also depended in part on whether age was included as a
covariate in the model. Many studies have found that the N2 is impacted by age, but the age
range and neural development of the sample also play a role in whether and how age impacts the
data. Lamm & Lewis (2010) found that children and adolescents developed more efficient neural
processes for emotional regulatory and inhibitory control as they aged. Similarly, Kadosh et al.
(2014) used behavioral methods to confirm that attentional control and emotion regulatory ability
increased throughout adolescence. On the opposite end of the lifespan, Zhou et al. (2015) found
that it was necessary to decrease cognitive task demands in a study assessing the N2 in older
adults, with decrease inhibition and a diminished N2 predicting decreased tolerance of negative
emotions. While studies using a developmental and lifespan framework have found significant
differences in age-related functioning, other studies relating cognitive control to distress
tolerance have found mixed results using age as a covariate. Macatee, Albanese, Clancy, et al.
(2018) found that age acted as a significant covariate for the P2, but not the N2. Both Bardeen et
al. (2015) and Macatee, Albanese, Clancy, et al. (2018) found no significant correlation of age
with distress tolerance and no interpretational differences when evaluating age as a covariate.
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It is likely that age was a deterministic covariate due to the sample being made up of
emerging adults ranging from 18 to 28 years old (with one extreme outlier at 42 years old),
creating greater variability in cognitive control and subsequent N2 amplitudes based on the level
of neural development. Increased white matter integrity and cortical growth in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex during emerging adulthood contribute to the development of cognitive control,
including planning, delaying gratification, impulse control, and self-monitoring (Henin &
Berman, 2016) which are sensitive to environmental changes (Friedman et al., 2016). Emerging
adults also learn to regulate their emotions more effectively using environmental feedback, with
regulatory strategy use predicted psychosocial functioning (Brewer et al., 2016). While the
magnitude of the N2 response may depend in part on the age and neural maturity of the
participant, the lack of significance following the addition of age to the model more likely
indicates that age acts as a third variable to explain rather than negate the initial significant
results.
The lack of significant moderation may be attributed to a number of methodological or
theoretical factors. Firstly, the effect sizes found in this study were smaller than anticipated,
potentially due to the use of different data collection modalities in analyses. A smaller effect size
would require greater power to detect than may have been present in the sample. Given the small
effect size and low post-hoc power, it is likely that the study did not have the power to detect
interactive effects. Other factors related to how emotion regulation and cognitive control interact
such as emotional salience of the stimuli and temporal positioning of cognitive processes in
relation to the stimulus may also have influenced results. For instance, Tottenham et al. (2011)
found that emotion regulation ability and cognitive control concurrently increased from

47
childhood to adolescence and adolescence to emerging adulthood using an emotional Go-NoGo
task.
The potential influence of results by temporal characteristics would be consistent with the
dual mechanisms of control framework (Braver, 2012) and process specific timing hypothesis
(Sheppes & Gross, 2011). The dual mechanism of control framework states that task-related,
trait-related, and neural integrity factors all play a role in the variability of cognitive control and
proposes that proactive and reactive inhibitory cognitive control have different mechanisms
similar to top-down and bottom-up processing (Einhäuser et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2009). The
process specific timing hypothesis states that emotion regulation processes differ based on the
stage of information processing that they occur in. Antecedent-focused emotion regulation
happens early in the information processing, is less likely to be impacted by emotional intensity,
and requires less effort, but is usually best suited for short-term goals. Response-focused emotion
regulation processes are better suited for long-term goals, but require greater effort and tolerance
of initial distress. Taken together, these two frameworks suggest that temporal dynamics may
impact the relationship between emotion regulation, cognitive control, and tolerance of negative
emotions. It may be beneficial for future studies to assess the differences in interactive effects
using early and late processing for group comparisons.
Findings suggest that managing cognitive demands may be important to ensure the
availability of cognitive resources for tolerance of negative emotions. Thus, an individual
wishing to pursue a goal that will require tolerance of negative emotion should attempt to
decrease their task demands in areas unrelated to the desired goal. Based on respective effect
sizes, emotion regulation training is also likely to incur benefits over cognitive control training
for those with difficulties persisting through emotional distress in the service of a goal. Previous
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interventions such as DBT (Linehan, 1987) have used emotion regulation training and distress
tolerance training concurrently, without regard for the order of effects. It may then be helpful to
use emotion regulation training to increase regulatory self-efficacy in order to increase the
effectiveness of distress tolerance skills training. Emotion Regulation Therapy (Renna et al.,
2017) and Affect Regulation Training (Berking & Lukas, 2015; Berking & Whitley, 2014) have
focused on emotion regulation ability for the treatment of anxiety and depression, but current
findings suggest that these interventions may have broader applications for subclinical
populations as well.
Limitations
The results must be considered in light of several limitations to the generalizability of
findings. Convenience sampling was utilized in the present study with primarily white, female
psychology undergraduate students. Due to the structure of the university research pool, selection
bias may have been present for participants willing and able to complete the on-campus study,
though no evidence of selection bias was found in the study variables. The cross-sectional nature
of the data also limits the interpretability of causality from results. The present study data was
collected in conjunction with a larger study, thus the length of the study tasks requiring sustained
attention may also have contributed to mental fatigue effects. The sample size may also have
limited the analyses and interpretability of results. Though the sample size provided the power
required to detect medium effects sizes, power may not have been sufficient to detect the small
interactive effects. Lastly, the inclusion of covariates may have been limited by the sample size.
Due to low numbers of participants in respective groups, it was difficult to make meaningful
evaluations about group differences in gender and ethnicity. Additionally, covariation of affect
using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was not possible
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to include due to missing data. Future studies including larger and more diverse samples may
assist with the replications of current findings.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Self-regulation research has supported a line of literature focusing on goal-oriented
regulation mechanisms to gain a better understanding of factors that allow an individual to
effectively adapt to a given situation. This study aimed to close a gap in the literature concerning
specific mechanisms of cognitive-affective self-regulation by evaluating the relationships
between emotion regulation ability, cognitive control, and tolerance of negative emotions.
Findings contributed to the body of research by confirming that the effects of emotion regulation
on tolerance of negative emotions are partially distinct from cognitive control. It was also
determined that it may be beneficial to view the association between cognitive control and
tolerance of negative emotions from a developmental lens. Studies incorporating neuroimaging
to assess cross-modal processes required for tolerance of negative emotions at different stages of
cognitive and emotional development may also be helpful in elucidating cognitive mechanisms
involved in the tolerance of negative emotions.
Future studies may wish to assess differences in self-regulatory processes as influenced
by emotionally salient and non-emotionally salient stimuli. It may also be beneficial to explore
whether effects are dependent on the temporal characteristics of the cognitive and emotional
regulatory processes associated with tolerance of negative emotions. Longitudinal comparisons
of self-efficacy and behavioral emotion regulation may also assist in gaining a better mechanistic
understanding of how emotion regulation impacts tolerance of negative emotions and determine
causal effects.
Results strengthen evidence for the use of emotion regulation training to increase
tolerance of negative emotions and suggest that interventions using emotion regulation skills are
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likely to work better for increasing tolerance of negative emotions than interventions focused
solely on cognitive training. Findings indicate the importance of regulatory self-efficacy in the
pursuit of goals that may require tolerating negative emotions. This research also has
implications for future research on the identification of goals as an important aspect of the ability
to self-regulate and tolerate distress. Advances in our understanding of self-regulatory processes
influencing tolerance of negative emotions can allow more focused treatment of distress
tolerance related mental health disorders and can provide training for those at increased risk for
mental health disorders.
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APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHICS

1. What is your age? ________

2. What is your student status?
( ) Full-time

( ) Part-time

3. What is your class standing?
( ) Freshman
( ) Sophomore
( ) Junior
( ) Senior
( ) Graduate
( ) Other (please specify) ____________

4. Current residence:
( ) On-campus dormitory
( ) On-campus living-learning community
( ) Off-campus house or apartment
( ) Greek-affiliated residence (fraternity/sorority)
( ) With family
( ) Other (please specify) ____________

5. What is your GPA?

6. What is your involvement in social fraternities or sororities?
( ) A current member
( ) Currently pledging
( ) Not a member, but regularly or occasionally attend Greek social events
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( ) Not a member, and do not attend Greek events

7. Are you currently employed?
( ) I am not employed
( ) I typically work about 20 hours or less per week
( ) I typically work about 20 to 35 hours per week
( ) I typically work more than 35 hours per week
( ) Other (please specify) ____________

8. What is your gender?
( ) Male

( ) Female

( ) Trans*

( ) Other

9. What is your relationship status?
( ) Single
( ) Married
( ) Divorced / Separated
( ) In a committed relationship
( ) Other (please specify) ________________

10. Are you Hispanic or Latino?
( ) Yes

( ) No

11. My ethnicity is (select all that apply):
( ) Black, African American, Afro-Caribbean, Black African, Other in this category.
( ) White, Caucasian, European American, White European, Other in this category.
( ) East Asian, Asian American, Amerasian, Asian-Caribbean, Other in this category.
( ) Latino/a, Hispanic, Spanish, Latin American, of Spanish speaking-South American/Caribbean
heritage, Other in this category.
( ) South Asian, South Asian American, of South Asian heritage, Other in this category.
( ) Middle Eastern, Arab, Non-Black North African, Other in this category.
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( ) Native American, American Indian, Alaskan Native, Other in this category.
( ) Pacific Islander, Other in this category.

12. How do you define your sexual identity? Would you say that you are:
( ) Only homosexual
( ) Mostly homosexual
( ) Bisexual
( ) Mostly heterosexual
( ) Only heterosexual
( ) Other (please specify) ________________________.
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APPENDIX B
DIFFICULTIES IN EMOTION REGULATION SCALE-SHORT FORM
Please indicate how often the following apply to you:

Almost
never (010%)

Sometimes
(11-35%)

About Half Most of the
of the time Time (66(36-65%)
90%)

Almost
Always
(91100%)

1. I pay attention to how I
feel.

1

2

3

4

5

2. I have no idea how I am
feeling

1

2

3

4

5

3. I have difficulty making
sense out of my feelings.

1

2

3

4

5

4. I care about what I am
feeling.

1

2

3

4

5

5. I am confused about how
I feel

1

2

3

4

5

6. When I’m upset, I
acknowledge my emotions.

1

2

3

4

5

7. When I’m upset, I
become embarrassed for
feeling that way.

1

2

3

4

5

8. When I’m upset, I have
difficulty getting work
done.

1

2

3

4

5
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9. When I’m upset, I
become out of control.

1

2

3

4

5

10. When I’m upset, I
believe that I will end up
feeling very depressed.

1

2

3

4

5

11. When I’m upset, I have
difficulty focusing on other
things

1

2

3

4

5

12. When I’m upset, I feel
guilty for feeling that way.

1

2

3

4

5

13. When I’m upset, I have
difficulty concentrating.

1

2

3

4

5

14. When I’m upset, I
have1difficulty controlling
my behaviors.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6. When I’m upset, I become
irritated with myself for
feeling that way.

1

2

3

4

5

17. When I’m upset, I lose
control over my behavior.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

15. When I’m upset, I
believe there is nothing I can
do to make myself feel
better.

18. When I’m upset, it takes
me a long time to feel better.
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APPENDIX C
DISTRESS TOLERANCE SCALE
Directions: Think of times that you feel distressed or upset. Select the item from the menu that
best describes your beliefs about feeling distressed or upset

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly agree

Mildly agree

Agree and
disagree
equally

Mildly disagree

Strongly
disagree

1. Feeling distressed or upset is unbearable to me.
2. When I feel distressed or upset, all I can think about is how bad I feel.
3. I can’t handle feeling distressed or upset.
4. My feelings of distress are so intense that they completely take over.
5. There’s nothing worse than feeling distressed or upset.
6. I can tolerate being distressed or upset as well as most people.
7. My feelings of distress or being upset are not acceptable.
8. I’ll do anything to avoid feeling distressed or upset.
9. Other people seem to be able to tolerate feeling distressed or upset better than I can.
10. Being distressed or upset is always a major ordeal for me.
11. I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed or upset.
12. My feelings of distress or being upset scare me.
13. I’ll do anything to stop feeling distressed or upset.
14. When I feel distressed or upset, I must do something about it immediately.
15. When I feel distressed or upset, I cannot help but concentrate on how
bad the distress actually feels.
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